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Attempts to elucidate the kinds of “thing” or “things” to which the term shamanic journeying
image is referentially linked must grapple with two related questions: what is the fundamental nature of shamanic journeying images, and how might the origin of a shamanic
journeying image be found? The first question is ontological, concerned with the nature
and essence of shamanic journeying images. In contrast, the second is epistemological and
methodolgical, concerned with how to acquire knowledge of shamanic journeying images.
We demonstrate how inductive and deductive reasoning, the private language argument,
and reification render problematic the resolution of both. Finally, we present a method to
preliminarily formulate an ontology and epistemology of shamanic journeying imagery.

T

he term shamanism typically refers to “a group
of techniques by which its practitioners enter the
‘spirit world,’ purportedly obtaining information
that is used to help and to heal members of their social
group” (Krippner, 2000, p. 93). Several researchers
(e.g., Heinze, 1991; Ripinsky-Naxon, 1993) argue that
this information is accessed during altered states of
consciousness (ASCs), principally those ASCs involving
soul flight (i.e., ecstatic journeying; Krippner, 2002). That
is to say, shamanic practices (e.g., ingesting psychoactive
plants, sonic driving, ritualized dancing) ostensibly
produce shifts in consciousness which Harner (1990)
referred to as shamanic states of consciousness. In other
papers (e.g., Rock & Krippner, 2007a, 2007b), we have
provided our rationale for replacing the term shamanic
state of consciousness with shamanic pattern of phenomenal
properties, and will use the latter term throughout this
article.
Noll (1985) asserted that an integral feature
of shamanism is the utilization of “…techniques for
inducing, maintaining, and interpreting the experience
of enhanced visual mental imagery” (p. 445). Similarly,
Peters (1989) stated that, “The shaman is a visualizer…”
(p. 130) who relies on this modality to access
transpersonal realms. Indeed, Houran, Lange, and
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Crist-Houran (1997) analyzed 30 phenomenological
reports concerning shamanic journeying, derived from
Harner (1990), and found that 93.3% emphasized visual
phenomena. Shamanic visualizations (i.e., journeying
imagery) typically reflect one’s cultural cosmology
(Krippner, 1990; Walsh, 1995, 2007), which tends to
be a multi-layered universe consisting of an upper world,
middle world (the terrestrial world or Earth) and lower
world (Ellwood, 1987).2
In recent years, shamanic practices have generated
increasing interest as a complementary therapeutic
strategy in the traditional medical and psychological
arenas (Bittman et al., 2001). Consequently, it may prove
prudent to further investigate the nature of shamanic
patterns of phenomenal properties (e.g., journeying
imagery). Nevertheless, to our knowledge, there exists
a lacuna in the literature with regards to a systematic
analysis of the philosophical problems that hamper
the development of an ontology and epistemology of
shamanic journeying imagery.
Ontology may be defined as “the matter of
what there is in the world” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 41); it
is concerned with “an overall conception of how things
are” (Heil, 1998, p. 6). The term ontological foundations
refers to the fundamental nature or essence of a particular
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variable, X (e.g., a shamanic journey image). For example,
an ontologist might be concerned with whether the kind
of thing that a shamanic journeying image is referentially
linked to is imaginal (e.g., derived from material stored
in one’s long-term memory system) or transpersonal (i.e.,
independent of the percipient’s mind-body complex)
(Walsh, 1990).
In contrast, epistemology may be defined as
the study of the “origins, nature, methods, and limits of
human knowledge” (Reber & Reber, 2001, p. 246). With
regards to shamanic patterns of phenomenal properties,
one might, for example, investigate the epistemological
process that results in a percipient becoming aware of
a shamanic journeying image. While epistemological
debates in the philosophy of religion have tended to focus
on mystical experience (e.g., Evans, 1989; Forman, 1996;
Gill, 1984; Katz, 1978, 1983; Stoeber, 1991), one might
contend that the epistemological problems discussed
are also applicable to shamanic patterns of phenomenal
properties. For example, there is no reason in principle
why the epistemological issue of whether mystical
experience is shaped conceptually and linguistically
by one’s cultural milieu is not applicable to shamanic
patterns of phenomenal properties. Indeed, a recent series
of papers (e.g., Rock & Baynes, 2005, 2007) investigated
the extent to which shamanic journeying imagery is
shaped by contextual influences (e.g., the shaman’s
cultural cosmology and autobiographical memories).3
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how
various philosophical problems impede the formulation
of an ontology and epistemology of shamanic journeying
imagery. We proceed by demonstrating that the problem
of induction constitutes an inherent limitation associated
with recent experimental studies investigating the origin
of shamanic journeying imagery. Subsequently, we
develop and critique a deductive argument concerning the
ontology of shamanic journeying imagery. Wittgenstein’s
(1958) private language argument and the fallacy of
reification are also considered in the context of shamanic
journeying imagery. Finally, we present a methodology
that arguably constitutes a preliminary step towards the
formulation of an ontology and epistemology of shamanic
journeying imagery.
Previous Experimental Research
Concerning the Origins
of Shamanic Journeying Imagery
ttempts to elucidate the kinds of thing or things that
the term shamanic journeying image is referentially
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linked to may prompt one to address two intimately
related questions: (1) What is the fundamental nature of
shamanic journeying images? (2) How might one find the
origin of a shamanic journeying image? The first question
is ontological; that is, it is concerned with the nature and
essence of the shamanic journeying image. In contrast,
the second is an epistemological and methodological
question; it relates to how one might acquire certain
knowledge. It is arguable that 1 and 2 are inextricably
bound at a fundamental level. That is to say, answering 2
presumably provides one with the methodology necessary
to address 1.
Rock and Baynes (2005, 2007) addressed 2 by
developing a non-hypnotic version of Watkins’ (1971)
Affect Bridge (a hypnotic technique used to uncover the
origin of an affect) for the purpose of investigating the
origins of shamanic journeying imagery. The Modified
Affect Bridge was developed as one potential partial
solution to 2; it was not designed to facilitate unrestricted
access to one’s unconscious material, but rather to facilitate
ordinary remembering among ordinary participants in
a non-clinical context. The Modified Affect Bridge was
first applied in an experimental context by Rock, Casey
and Baynes (2006) and, subsequently, Rock (2006).
Rock, Casey, and Baynes (2006) reported that
ostensibly shamanic journey images encountered by
naïve participants journeying to the lower world with
the aid of monotonous drumming at 8 beats-per-second
for 15 minutes were just as likely to be derived from
autobiographical memories as spontaneous visual mental
images reported by naïve participants assigned to the
control condition of sitting quietly with eyes open for 15
minutes. This finding suggests that the epistemological
process that results in one being consciously aware
of an ostensibly shamanic journeying image involves
memory recall and superimposition within one’s
phenomenal space. Consequently, the journeying images
may be tentatively assigned an imaginal ontological
status. Subsequently, Rock (2006) randomly allocated
participants to counterbalanced factorial combinations of
a repeated-measures factor and a between-groups factor.
The repeated-measures factor consisted of four stimulus
conditions (i.e., monotonous drumming, Ganzfeld,
relaxation, sitting quietly with eyes open). The betweengroups factor consisted of three sets of instructions (i.e.,
journeying to the lower world with or without religious
instructions, no instructions). It was concluded that visual
mental images encountered while journeying to the lower
world were derived primarily from autobiographical
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memories. Other visual mental images were tentatively
labelled as symbolic, transpersonal, and indeterminate.
The results of Rock, Casey, and Baynes (2006) and
Rock (2006) facilitated the development of a tentative fourfold ostensibly shamanic journeying imagery origin typology
consisting of autobiographical, symbolic, transpersonal
and indeterminate sources. An ostensibly shamanic
journeying image may be categorized as autobiographical
if it appears to be the derivative of an autobiographical
memory, that is, a “memory for events that have occurred
in one’s life” (Reber & Reber, 2001, p. 423). The symbolic
characterization of an ostensibly shamanic journeying
image is invoked if the image seems to perform a symbolic
function without appearing to mentally represent a
previous sensory experience. An ostensibly shamanic
journeying image may be conceptualized as transpersonal
if the image appears to be linked to something that exists
independently of the participant’s mind-body complex.
Finally, an indeterminate status is conferred upon an
ostensibly shamanic journeying image if the participant
is unable to isolate its origin (Rock & Baynes, 2007).
Given that the Modified Affect Bridge was
formulated as a potential partial solution to 2, and
has yielded four imagery-origin categories thereby
addressing 1, it might be asked, “How might one resolve
the ontological foundations of shamanic journeying
imagery?” In this context, it may be efficacious to consider
Mercante’s (2008) suggestion that a persuasive argument
for considering imagery associated with the Ayahuasca
experience (i.e., miração, singular; mirações, plural) an
“involuntary and spontaneous process is that voluntary
events rely on memory” (pp. 6-7). Extrapolating from
Farthing’s (1992) discussion of mental imagery to
miração, Mercante (2008) wrote:
If the arrival and dissipation of mirações were subject
to the command of the individual, it would follow
that no “alien” elements (outside a person’s familiar
universe) would be present.... The idea is that one can
only voluntarily manipulate images that are impressed
upon the memory through sensation. Not that a
person cannot assemble new patterns from recorded
sensory data, but he or she cannot manufacture
fundamental data beyond the pale of experience. The
revelatory qualities of the miração would be lost or at
least considered illusory if the experience of it were
limited to the cache of existing memory (pp. 6-7).
One may apply Mercante’s (2008) argument
to shamanic journeying imagery and contend that if
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shamanic journeying images are immune to voluntarily
manipulation, then shamanic journeying images are not
constructed from material derived from a percipients’
long-term memory system. Ethnographic data, however,
suggests that shamans tend to cultivate a mastery over
journeying images (e.g., Noll, 1985), thus indicating—
provided one accepts Mercante’s (2008) preceding
argument—that shamanic journeying imagery is the
result of an epistemological process involving memory
recall and superimposition within a percipient’s
phenomenal space.
Furthermore, it is arguable that even if the
outward appearance of a shamanic journeying image, X,
is derived from material stored in a percipient’s long-term
memory system, this does not necessarily preclude the
ontological foundations of X from being transpersonal.
For example, if a shaman or experimental participant
encounters a predatory creature during a journey to
the lower world—and the outward appearance of this
predatory creature is the derivative of an autobiographical
memory—it remains possible that the predatory creature
is merely the manifestation or persona of an external
entity. Strassman (2001), for instance, suggested that
entities encountered during dimethyltryptamineinduced patterns of phenomenal properties tend to
manifest in forms recognizable to the percipient (e.g.,
“elves,” “aliens,” “angels,” “deceased relatives”), and yet
may reside in parallel universes or dark matter realms.
Problems of Induction and Deduction
et us assume, for the sake of argument, that there
are six necessary conditions (hereafter N1…N6) for a
visual mental image to qualify as a shamanic journeying
image and that the conjunction of N1…N6 constitutes
a sufficient condition. Let us further assume that N6
states that the ontological foundations of a visual mental
image, X, must be Y (where Y is currently unknown). An
ontologist might be concerned with whether the kind of
thing (i.e., denoted by Y ) that a shamanic journeying
image is referentially linked to is imaginal (i.e., a
projection of the shaman’s mental set) or transpersonal
(i.e., independent of the shaman’s mind-body complex)
(Walsh, 1990).
Future research might formulate an a posteriori
derived definition for Y by comparing Xs that satisfy
N1…N5 (group 1) with Xs that satisfy four or less of
the aforementioned necessary conditions (group 2).
Specifically, one may use the Modified Affect Bridge to
investigate whether group 1 is associated with different
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categories of Ys compared to group 2. Given that group
2 does not satisfy N1…N5 (N6 notwithstanding), the
ostensible shamanic journeying image status of this group
is falsified. In contrast, the constituents of group 1 have
not been falsified because they satisfy N1…N5. If it is
observed that all of the constituents of groups 1 are derived
from, for example, a transpersonal source, then one might
tentatively infer that Y is a transpersonal source and,
thus, N6 would state that the ontological foundations of a
visual mental image, X, must be transpersonal. However,
if, for instance, some constituents of group 1 appear
to be derived from a transpersonal source, while other
constituents of group 1 do not, then it may be such that
the transpersonal constituents of group 1 are shamanic
journeying images and, thus, Y is a transpersonal source;
whereas the non-transpersonal constituents of group 1
are merely visual mental images. That is, if N6, in fact,
states that the ontological foundations of a visual mental
image, X, must be transpersonal, then the transpersonal
constituents of Group 1 satisfy N1…N6, which is
a sufficient condition for qualifying as a shamanic
journeying image. In contrast, the ostensible shamanic
status of the non-transpersonal constituents of group 1
would be falsified on the grounds that these constituents
fail to satisfy N6. It is, of course, logically possible that
Y, in fact, denotes a non-transpersonal source and, thus,
the non-transpersonal constituents of group 1 satisfy
N1…N6, while the transpersonal constituents of group 1
would be falsified.
However, if one were able to definitively
demonstrate that shamanic journeying images X1, X 2,
X 3…X10 were all derived from, for example, transpersonal
sources, then to presuppose that X11 is also derived
from a transpersonal source is to commit the fallacy
of induction, that is, moving from particular instances
to general principles. For example, Rosenberg (2000)
suggested that the observation “that the sun has risen
many days in the past is good grounds to believe it will do
so tomorrow, but does not make it logically certain that
it will” (p. 177). Consequently, induction is inherently
limited. Additionally, if the ontological foundations were
different for X1, X 2, X 3…X10 (e.g., autobiographical for X1
and X 2, symbolic for X10, indeterminate for X7 and X8),
then one might contend that such variability hampers
N6’s usefulness as a necessary condition.
Similarly, deductive models (i.e., moving from
general principles to particular instances) are inherently
limited. For example, one may formulate a logically valid
argument concerning the identity of Y but there is no

guarantee that such an argument is logically sound.
Consider the following deductive argument:
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1. All shamanic journeying images are derived
from transpersonal sources;
2. X is a shamanic journeying image;
3. Therefore X is derived from a transpersonal
source.
It may be observed that while the preceding argument’s
conclusion follows logically from its premises, it may of
course be such that all shamanic journeying images are
not derived from transpersonal sources.
The aforementioned problems associated with
attempts to formulate an ontology and epistemology
of shamanic journeying imagery using inductive
or deductive reasoning are further complicated by
Wittgenstein’s (1958) private language argument and the
fallacy of reification.
The Private Language Argument
n a private language it is held that terms “refer to what
can only be known to the person speaking; to his
immediate private sensations. So another person cannot
understand the language” (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 8889). The notion of a private language is underpinned by an
argument for solipsism: “I can only believe that someone
else is in pain, but I know if I am” (Wittgenstein, 1958,
p. 102). A privileged observer (i.e., first-person) may, for
example, establish a link between the term pain and the
phenomenal properties of pain. However, it is possible
that the privileged observer’s private definition may
be erroneously applied in subsequent instances due to
false memory impressions concerning the phenomenal
properties of pain (Malcolm, 1981). Consequently,
Wittgenstein (1958) asserted that one should, “always
get rid of the idea of a private object in this way: assume
that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice
the change because your memory constantly deceives
you” (p. 207). To summarize, Wittgenstein’s (1958)
private language argument undermined: (1) the ability
of a nonprivileged observer to correctly apprehend the
meanings of terms applied to phenomenal properties by a
privileged observer; and (2) the reliability of a privileged
observer’s application of terms to the phenomenal
properties known by his or her conscious awareness.
The epistemological presuppositions associated
with shamanic journeying imagery are two-fold and
inextricably related at a fundamental level: (1) a privileged
observer can, via introspection, know a shamanic

I

journeying image; and (2) a privileged observer may
communicate the introspected shamanic journeying
image to a nonprivileged observer. Clearly, in order to
categorize an image as shamanic one must first learn the
meaning of the term shamanic. A nonprivileged observer
might endeavor to learn the meaning of “objects”
commensurate with a shamanic journeying image, X,
by attempting to correctly apprehend the meanings of
linguistic terms applied by a privileged observer to the
set of constituents associated with X, xyz. However, as
previously stated, Wittgenstein (1958) asserted that
such terms “refer to what can only be known to the
person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So
another person cannot understand the language” (pp.
88-89). That is, while a nonprivileged observer may be
informed that X exhibits a certain set of constituents,
xyz, Wittgenstein’s (1958) private language argument
undermined a nonprivileged observer’s ability to correctly
apprehend the meanings of linguistic terms applied to
xyz by a privileged observer. Consequently, while it is
possible that a nonprivileged observer may subsequently
engage in the privileged observation of xyz, and thus X,
it is impossible to verify that such a mental event has
occurred. This epistemological problem is compounded
by the suggestion that a privileged observer’s false
memory impressions concerning xyz, and thus X, may
result in the unreliable application of linguistic terms to
xyz, and thus X, in future instances.
This raises a further epistemological problem.
Tart (1975) emphasized the state-specificity of
knowledge, while Fischer (1980) asserted that one may
experience difficulty recalling events that occur “in
another state of arousal” (p. 306). Consequently, the
probability of a privileged observer unreliably recalling
a phenomenal property associated with what Tart (1975)
referred to as a particular state of consciousness, SoC1,
due to a false memory impression, may exponentially
increase when functioning in a SoC other than SoC1
(e.g., SoC2…n). Consequently, this may compromise a
privileged observer’s ability to retrospectively assess an
image as shamanic while functioning in ordinary waking
consciousness.

concreteness, which he defined as “…the accidental error
of mistaking the abstract for the concrete” (p. 66).
An awareness of the fallacy associated with
reifying consciousness may be observed in James’
(1890) contention that “consciousness does not exist,”
which Chalmers (1996) suggested is interpretable as an
attempt to argue that consciousness does not exemplify
the property of thing-ness. Indeed, Klein (1984) stated
that James (1890) avoided committing the fallacy of
reification by asserting that consciousness is a function
or process of knowing, rather than a thing-like entity.
One might argue, with some justification, that
experimental studies of shamanic journeying imagery
that use, for example, Pekala’s (1991) Phenomenology of
Consciousness Inventory (PCI; a 53-item questionnaire that
purportedly quantifies the structures of consciousness)
commit an ontological mistake by concretizing mental
phenomena (e.g., visual mental imagery), thereby
conflating mentalism with materialism. Pekala (1991)
has committed the fallacy of reification (Eacker,
1972) or misplaced concreteness (Whitehead, 1946)
by attempting to quantify consciousness, and thus
contravenes James’ (1890) contention that consciousness
is not a thing-like entity, but rather a function or process
of knowing (Klein, 1984). Indeed, Pekala (1991) has
routinely engaged in the kind of fallacious reasoning
whereby an abstract noun (e.g., “state absorption,”
“rationality,” “positive affect”) is reified and ascribed
a numerical value. The problem of reification would
appear difficult to circumvent, however, given that,
presently, mental phenomena cannot be investigated via
the scientific method—and thus measured—until they
are reified by the assignment of operational definitions
commensurate with the ontological status of thing-like
entities.
While Wittgenstein’s (1958) private language
argument and the fallacy of reification problematize the
findings of shamanic research, it does not necessarily
follow that the findings are rendered spurious. Indeed,
a more measured approach might be to develop an
appreciation of these issues and merely interpret one’s
results with a suitable level of caution.

The Fallacy of Reification
eichenbach (1951) employed the axiom sub
stantialization of abstracta to denote the fallacy of
reification whereby an abstract noun (e.g., consciousness)
is confused with a thing-like entity. Similarly, Whitehead
(1946) referred to reification as the fallacy of misplaced

A Way Forward
rior to formulating an ontology and epistemology
of shamanic journeying images one must develop
criteria designed to distinguish shamanic journeying
images from other images. That is to say, one cannot
investigate a particular phenomenon if one is bereft
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of a methodology that may be used to identify that
phenomenon.
One may assess the ostensible shamanic status
of visual mental images using Rock and Krippner’s
(2008) criteria for the necessary conditions for shamanic
journeying imagery. The first necessary condition (N1)
states that a visual mental image, X, must be integrated
with other visual mental images. The term integrated is
invoked to underscore that during shamanic journeying
experiences various visual mental images coalesce to
form cohesive “geographies” or “landscapes.” N2 states
that the outward appearance (i.e., form or garb) of X
must be consistent with a shamanic cosmology. N3 states
that X must be consistent with the purpose of the specific
shamanic journey. Finally, N4 states that the function
of X must be consistent with X. The term function is
employed to indicate the activities or actions expected
of X according to a specific shamanic cosmology. If
an X satisfies N1…N4, then the purported shamanic
journeying status of X is not falsified. It is noteworthy,
however, that it does not necessarily follow that X is a
shamanic journeying image because the conjunction of
N1…N4 may not constitute a sufficient condition (i.e.,
there may exist other necessary conditions that have been
overlooked).
Future research may use Rock and Krippner’s
(2008) criteria to evaluate Xs reported by participants
exposed to shamanic techniques (e.g., rhythmic
drumming). Subsequently, the ontological status of Xs
that satisfy N1…N4 could be explored. Methodological
advances in the field of consciousness studies provide
an indication of how this secondary aim might be
accomplished. For example, as previous stated, Pekala
(1991) developed the PCI to ostensibly quantify the
structures of consciousness. The PCI contains a threeitem dimension that purportedly quantifies one’s
subjective sense of an altered state of awareness (SSAS;
e.g., “I felt in an extremely different and unusual state of
consciousness”). However, there is no reason in principle
why one’s subjective sense of the imaginal and the
transpersonal could not be similarly explored. Indeed,
items could be constructed to quantify the intensity of
one’s subjective sense that a shamanic journeying image
is derived from an imaginal or transpersonal source
(e.g., “The image seemed to be created by my mind” and
“The image seemed to be linked to an entity beyond my
personhood,” respectively).
While the aforementioned methodology clearly
does not resolve the various problems that constitute the

foci of this paper, it does ostensibly allow researchers
to: (1) identify shamanic journeying images, and
(2) assess a percipient’s subjective sense of whether a
shamanic journeying image is imaginal or transpersonal.
Consequently, it is arguable that this methodology
constitutes an initial step towards the formulation of
an ontology and epistemology of shamanic journeying
imagery.
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Conclusion
t was suggested that the utility of empirical findings
concerning the origins of shamanic journeying imagery
are inherently limited by the problem of induction.
Subsequently, we developed a deductive argument
regarding the ontology of shamanic journeying imagery
and demonstrated that while the argument was logically
valid (i.e., the conclusion followed logically from its
premises), there was no guarantee that the argument was
logically sound. We further argued that an application
of Wittgenstein’s (1958) private language argument to
shamanic journeying imagery undermines: (1) the ability
of a nonprivileged observer to correctly apprehend the
meanings of the term shamanic journeying imagery
applied to phenomenal properties by a privileged
observer; and (2) the reliability of a privileged observer’s
application of the term shamanic journeying imagery
to the phenomenal properties known by his or her
conscious awareness. Finally, we suggested that attempts
to quantify the phenomenology of consciousness (e.g.,
journeying imagery) constitute an ontological mistake
referred to as reification by conflating mentalism with
materialism.
The inherent inadequacies of methodologies
underpinned by inductive and deductive reasoning
coupled with philosophical problems associated with
reification and a private language referentially linked
to mental objects facilitates what Walsh (1990) referred
to as ontological indeterminacy. Indeed, it may not be
hyperbole to suggest that the fundamental nature of
shamanic journeying imagery is currently unresolvable
because there is no absolute method with which to
examine this phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is arguable
that Rock and Krippner’s (2008) necessary conditions
for a visual mental image to qualify as a shamanic
journeying image, coupled with items designed to assess
a percipient’s subjective sense of whether a shamanic
journeying image is imaginal or transpersonal, constitute
an initial step towards the formulation of an ontology
and epistemology of shamanic journeying imagery.
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Notes
1. This study was supported, in part, by the Chair
for Consciousness Studies, Saybrook Graduate
School.
2. Shamanic journeying imagery is not restricted to
any particular sensory modality; that is, journeying
imagery may be visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory,
tactile or multi-modal (Walsh, 1995). However,
for the purpose of the present paper, shamanic
journeying images will be delimited to their visual
modality because these are arguably the most
abundant (Houran, Lange, & Crist-Houran, 1997;
Noll, 1983).
3. One might argue that philosophical problems, by
definition, resist empirical testing. It is noteworthy,
however, that motivation and learning were once
conceptualized as philosophical problems and, thus,
held to be incongruent with the methodology of
science (Eacker, 1972).
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